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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly assess the facts 
of this case, and did the Court of Appeals apply the appropriate law 
relevant to whether Mr. Grueber possessed standing to challenge the 
seizure of the shotgun? 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
iv 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DARREN NEIL GRUEBER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 
Priority No. 13 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DARREN NEIL GRUEBER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 870532-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals1 opinion in State v. Grueber, 110 
Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah App. 1989) (Case No. 870532-CA, filed 
June 2, 1989), is attached to this Petition as Appendix A. On 
June 16, 1989, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Rehearing in 
the Court of Appeals. On July 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing. See Appendix B for a copy of 
the Court's order. 
JURISDICTION 
Following the Court of Appeals1 decision affirming 
Mr. Grueber's conviction, a Petition for Rehearing was timely filed 
with the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Rule 45(c) of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court, the filing of that Petition for Rehearing 
tolled the time for filing the Writ of Certiorari until thirty days 
following the denial of the Petition for Rehearing. This Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari therefore is timely filed in accordance with 
Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Jurisdiction is 
bestowed on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 
1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Darren Neil Grueber appeals from a judgment and 
conviction for Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended) following a 
jury trial held August 11-12, 1987, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy, Judge, presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed that conviction in its decision dated March 21, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 7, 1986, police officer Scott Robinson of the 
Murray City Police Department received word that a stolen welder was 
being offered for sale by individuals in a green and white Chevrolet 
van (R. 131 at 4-5). The license plate number of the van was 
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provided to officers, who ran the plate through the Department of 
Motor Vehicles learning that the van was registered to a Carolyn Ray 
(R. 131 at 7, 13, 15). Officer Robinson went to the address listed 
on the registration and waited for the van to return home (R. 131 at 
7, 15). 
A dispute exists as to what occurred next. Officer 
Robinson testified that when the van stopped, Mr. Grueber got out 
immediately.and ran to the back of the house (R. 130 at 7). Officer 
Robinson testified that he yelled at Mr. Grueber to stop and that he 
pursued Mr. Grueber around the side of the house until he 
encountered a dog (R. 130 at 7-8). Mr. Grueber insists that he 
stayed in the van for a while and then got out and walked to the 
back of the house (R. 25-26). Mr. Grueber claims that the officer 
did not arrest him or order him to stay and that he walked away 
because of a long-standing vendetta that the officer had against him 
(R. 25-26). 
In either event, Officer Robinson returned to the van and 
ultimately arrested a passenger, Zane Jensen, on an outstanding 
warrant charge (R. 130 at 55). Officer Robinson could see the 
welder through the windows of the van and entered to check for the 
serial number (R. 131 at 8). 
While looking for the serial number of the welder, 
Officer Robinson saw a shotgun and two Halloween masks (R. 131 at 
10-11). (These events occurred within days of Halloween (R. 131 at 
19-20)). Carolyn Ray identified the shotgun as hers, but Officer 
Robinson seized it anyway over her claims of legal ownership and 
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protestations (R. 28-29, R. 131 at 18). Officer Robinson stated the 
following reasons for seizing the shotgun and masks: (1) he 
believed the gun could have been stolen in conjunction with the 
welder, and (2) he believed the gun and masks could possibly be 
evidence used in a prior crime (R. 131 at 17-19). 
Subsequently, charges were filed against Mr. Grueber for 
an incident occurring August 13, 1986, roughly three months earlier, 
wherein the complainant, Michael Wade, contended that Mr. Grueber 
had shot at Mr. Wade while he drove in his van on the 1-15 freeway 
near the 1-80 interchange (R. 130 at 20). Mr. Wade claimed that a 
biker-type man had fired two shots at him from a green and white van 
with a sawed-off shotgun because he had not driven up a freeway 
on-ramp fast enough (R. 130 at 15). Mr. Wade had written down the 
license plate of that van and filed a complaint the same day it 
occurred, August 13, 1986 (R. 130 at 21, 29). The next day, 
August 14, 1986, the case was assigned to Police Officer Richard 
Mattingly, who then contacted Mr. Wade on August 15, 1986 (R. 130 at 
56). 
Three months later, after the incident with the welder 
had occurred,1 photographs of Mr. Grueber and others were shown to 
Mr. Wade. He identified Mr. Grueber as the man who had shot at him 
(R. 130 at 26, 30). Mr. Wade also identified the shotgun seized at 
the welder incident as the gun which had been pointed at him (R. 130 
1
 Notably, no charges were ever filed against any party 
in the welder incident despite Mr. Jensen's alleged confession 
because of insufficient evidence to establish a crime (R. 130 at 9, 
14). 
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at 26). 
Prior to his trial on Aggravated Assault charges, 
Mr. Grueber moved to suppress the evidence of the shotgun and masks 
cliaming they were seized in violation of his constitutional rights 
(R. 131). That motion was denied (R. 63, R. 131 at 33) and the case 
proceeded to trial (R. 130). 
At trial, Mr. Grueber renewed his objection to the 
admission of the shotgun into evidence (R. 130 at 60). The trial 
court admitted the shotgun into evidence (R. 130 at 60-61) 
consistent with its earlier ruling that (1) Mr. Grueber lacked 
standing to challenge the seizure, (2) Mr. Grueber abandoned all 
interest in the van and property when he ran (or walked) away, and 
(3) the search was not intrusive and did not violate the law (R. 131 
at 33) . 
Notably, the trial court refused to hear evidence on the 
question of the marital status of Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray and/or the 
details of the extent of their relationship (R. 131 at 28-29, 31, 
33). The trial court ruled that guns were not marital property and 
that Mr. Grueber could not object to the seizure of the weapon even 
if married to Ms. Ray (R. 131 at 31-32). 
The jury returned with a guilty verdict against 
Mr. Grueber (R. 100). On appeal, Mr. Grueber challenged the trial 
court's ruling on the seizure issue (Brief of Appellant at 11-19; 
see Appendix C). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
ruling (see Appendix A) and subsequently denied a petition for 
rehearing on this same issue (see Appendix B). 
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Mr. Grueber now seeks relief before this Court on his 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT 
MR. GRUEBER LACKED STANDING TO CHALLENGE AN 
UNLAWFUL SEIZURE IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND THE 
LAW. 
The panel of the Court of Appeals which heard this case 
ruled that Mr. Grueber lacked standing to challenge the seizure of 
the shotgun because he did not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the van or the seized shotgun. State v. Grueber, 110 
Utah Adv. Repc at 32. (See Appendix A). Importantly, the panel's 
decision not only negatively affects Mr. Grueber's rights but 
inappropriately establishes principles of standing which are 
contrary to both the federal and state law defining standing. This 
Court should grant this petition to correct the error made below and 
to clarify the doctrine of standing. 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), and its progeny espouse that 
claimants of search and seizure violations must demonstrate a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place in order to 
establish standing to challenge the violation, jrd. at 143. The 
panel of the Court of Appeals which heard this case correctly noted 
that this Court has adopted the Rakas standard as the proper test to 
be applied when determining questions of standing. 110 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 31 (citing State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 
- 6 -
1987)). 
The Court of Appeal's legal analysis of the issue of 
standing in this case consisted of listing the cases relied on by 
the parties and indicating which group of cases was most similar to 
the case at bar. The cases relied on by the State were Rakas v. 
Illinois; State v. Constantino; State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 
1984); and State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978). These cases 
all consist of non-owners of automobiles, either drivers or 
passengers, who failed to claim proprietary or permissive possessory 
interest in the vehicle and the items seized, or who actually denied 
the same. See the court's characterization of the cases at 110 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 31. 
Mr. Grueber relied on cases where the facts established a 
claim of interest either directly or from the factual circumstances 
of permissive and/or regular use of the place searched. Those cases 
were listed as United States v. Jeffers,2 342 U.S. 48 (1951); 
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987); and In re J.R.M., 
487 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. 1972) . 
In analyzing the cases, the court placed too much 
emphasis on the ownership question and too little importance on the 
factual considerations which demonstrate the expectation of privacy 
2
 The Court of Appeals assigned United States v. Jeffers 
as a case relied on by the Appellant. That claim is erroneous. 
While Jeffers is of some help, Mr. Grueber did not cite Jeffers in 
either his opening or reply brief. Nor did he elude to Jeffers at 
oral argument. Rather, he relied on Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543 (1968), a case more on point and pertinent to this case. 
See Appendix C, pp. 14-16. 
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and the legitimacy of that expectation. 
The Court of Appeals correctly indicated that the 
expectation of privacy test is "fact sensitive" rather than 
determined by a "bright line" standard. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. 
The court, however, then misconstrued and mischaracterized the facts 
of this case and misinterpreted and misapplied the pertinent law of 
standing achieving the erroneous result that Mr. Grueber lacked 
standing to challenge the seizure of the shotgun because he did not 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van or the seized 
shotgun. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32. 
Factual errors of significance in the court's opinion are 
as follows: 
Mr. Grueber was not arrested on November 7, 1986, as 
first suggested and then indicated by the court. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 30. The record reflects the arrest of Mr. Grueber did not occur 
on that day but occurred sometime later (R. 130 at 55). 
The court erroneously stated that the welder was 
identified by the representative of the golf course prior to the 
officer's entrance into the van to search for the identification 
number. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. The record actually indicates 
that Officer Robinson entered the van well before he contacted the 
complainant (R. 131 at 11). While these first two factual errors 
themselves do not impact on the issue of standing, these errors 
demonstrate the court's erroneous reconstruction of the facts of 
this case. 
Most important for the fact sensitive issue of standing, 
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the court unfairly minimized the relationship between Mr. Grueber 
and Ms. Ray by calling her "defendant's girlfriend" and by asserting 
as a "claim" and "allegation]" the fact that they lived together. 
The court ignored critical uncontested facts to the contrary. The 
record reflects that Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray not only had lived 
together for six years at the time of this incident (R. 130 at 112), 
but that they also referred to themselves as husband and wife 
(R. 25-29, 105) and together conceived and gave birth to three 
children with a fourth child born after the trial (R. 130 at 107, 
120). Even the prosecutor acknowledged them as husband and wife 
(R. 130 at 113). Accordingly, the facts support that much more than 
a boyfriend-girlfriend relationshp existed between Mr. Grueber and 
Ms. Ray and those facts belie the panel's characterization of a mere 
claim or allegation that they lived together. 
An important fact overlooked by the Court of Appeals' 
panel is that the trial court's challenged ruling included a refusal 
to hear evidence on the question of the marital status of 
Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray and/or the critical details of the extent of 
their relationship (R. 131 at 28-29, 31, 33). Therefore, when the 
panel complains that Mr. Grueber cited no evidence to establish the 
existence of such a relationship (110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32)—which 
could have been most easily demonstrated by facts of living 
arrangement and use of the van and/or the gun and other familial 
manifestations and expectations of privacy—the court errs on two 
counts. First, the record does contain and suggest evidence of 
their relationship and therefore Mr. Grueber's enhanced expectation 
- 9 -
of privacy and proprietary interests. Second, Mr. Grueber should 
not be penalized by the trial court's error to fail to allow that 
information to be more fully established. The appropriate remedy in 
that instance would be to return the case to the trial court to hear 
that evidence, not to deny standing because of its absence from the 
record by result of the courtfs ruling. 
The Court of Appeals1 panel mischaracterizes the facts 
when stating "the van was parked in front of Ms. Ray's home." 110 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 32. Mr. Grueber lived there as well (R. 130 at 
112) . 
The court mischaracterizes the facts when stating 
"defendant was not in the van when it was searched and the gun 
seized." 110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32. While technically correct, 
Mr. Grueber had left the van mere moments earlier—and from the 
drivers seat (R. 131 at 15-16). 
The court's comment that "[t]here is no evidence in the 
record establishing [Mr.] Grueber had Ms. Ray's permission to use 
either the van or the gun at will, had a key to the van, or even how 
often he had used either the van or the gun in the past" (110 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 32) is both incorrect and unfair. The statement is 
incorrect because, as the court itself acknowledged, Mr. Grueber was 
driving the car when it pulled into the driveway (110 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 30) necessarily establishing permission to use the van—inasmuch 
as Ms. Ray was with him—and further establishing his possession of 
a key. Additionally, while general at-will-use helps to establish 
expectations of privacy, the facts show that on this occasion, 
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Mr. Grueber had driven the car with permission and had parked in his 
driveway establishing that he had standing to challenge the search 
and seizure conducted immediately after he exited the car. The 
court's statement concluding a lack of evidence existed in the 
record to support a finding of standing is unfair because, as 
indicated above, the trial court refused to hear testimony on such 
evidence (R. 131 at 28-33). 
A final mischaracterization of a fact by the court 
requires addressing. The court states that Mr. Grueber did not know 
the gun was present in the van. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32. This 
statement is correct (R. 130 at 134). However, the court's 
implication that this fact more closely aligns his case to those 
cases where defendants denied possessory and/or proprietary 
interests in the vehicle or other articles seized is misplaced and 
in error. A critical distinction exists between someone who states, 
"that briefcase is not mine," thereby denouncing any proprietary or 
possessory interest (see State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 
1984)), and the case where Mr. Grueber states that he was unsure 
whether the gun was in the van (R. 130 at 134). Mr. Grueber's 
statement reveals nothing about his expectation of privacy from 
police seizure of familial articles. 
Notably, the court's conclusion that n[e]ven assuming the 
existence of a [live-in] relationship . . . we find [Mr.] Grueber 
did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van or the 
seized shotgun" (110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32) seriously minimizes the 
essential and critical facts. Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray shared much 
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more than the "live-in relationship" as characterized by the court; 
they were a functional family with shared familial interests. Their 
lack of legal marriage did not diminish any expectation of privacy 
that they shared. They (and others) recognized and treated 
themselves as married—husband and wife, and father and mother of 
their three children and the other children they raised together. 
When this Court properly characterizes the facts, the 
resulting legal analysis of the correct facts and state and federal 
standing principles supports that the trial court and then the Court 
of Appeals erred in finding that no standing existed for Mr. Grueber 
to challenge the search and seizure of the van and gun. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals emphasized the fourth 
amendment differences between houses or apartments and automobiles. 
110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. While a less stringent warrant 
requirement does exist between homes and cars, the cases which 
explain those distinctions (see, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 
583 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)) do not imply that any difference 
in the requirements of standing exists among the search of a home, 
an office, a telephone booth, or an automobile. The standard in 
each such locus is the legitimacy of the expectation of privacy, and 
the test of legitimacy is still that standard announced in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), wherein the United States 
Supreme Court held that the expectation must be one which society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 
U.S. 98, 104 (1980), citing Katz v. United States. 
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It is reasonable for parties who share their lives, as 
did Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray, to expect constitutional protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures of their home, automobile 
and other property. Mr. Grueber does not claim that, because of his 
relationship with Ms. Ray, he has vicarious standing in property 
identified as belonging to Ms. Ray. Rather, he insists the nature 
of the relationship results in a reasonable finding that society 
will recognize that his expectations of privacy are warranted. 
The facts of this case as now corrected present this 
Court with enough information to find that Mr. Grueber possessed an 
expectation of privacy in the van and in the gun despite the 
respective registrations being listed only in the name of Ms. Ray. 
A recent opinion from this Court supports Mr. Grueber's position. 
In State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1986), this Court 
found the appellant lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy 
because he failed to present evidence that he "shared ownership, use 
or possession of the trailer." In the instant case, the record does 
support Mr. Grueber's claimed expectation of privacy. His shared 
use and possession is certainly established, even conceded. 110 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 29-32. While the trial court's ruling disallowing 
the introduction of evidence of the relationship of Mr. Grueber and 
Ms. Ray prevents Appellant from undisputably establishing that 
actual ownership of the van and shotgun was shared, that inference 
is factually supportable from the record.3 
3 of note, Utah (society) recognizes the lifestyle of 
Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray to be akin to a legal marriage. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1987). 
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Analyzing the cases cited in the briefs of both parties 
now reveals Mr. Grueber more closely aligns with those cases finding 
standing. In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968),4 cited 
by Mr. Grueber and unaddressed by the Court of Appeals, a grandson 
was found to have standing to challenge a seizure of his 
grandmother's rifle taken in a search of his grandmother's house 
where he also lived because n[t]he rifle was used by all members of 
the household and was found in the common part of the house." Id. 
at 548 n.ll. 
The record in Mr. Grueber's case similarly supports that 
the van was used by all members of the family—Mr. Grueber (R. 130 
at 133), the children (R. 130 at 52), Ms. Ray (R. 131 at 7, 13, 16), 
and Ms. Ray's mother (R. 130 at 121-22). Notably, from the record 
only Mr. Grueber is acknowledged as the driver of the van. Nowhere 
does the record reveal Ms. Ray or anyone else ever drove the van 
even though it was registered in her name. The gun, as in Bumper, 
was also found in a general location common to all in the family and 
in no way excluded Mr. Grueber's interest in it. 
Other critical facts appearing in his case and those 
cases where standing was found are as follows: The car was parked 
in Mr. Grueber's driveway. He had just vacated the van after 
driving it under circumstances demanding an inference that his 
driving was with the registered owner's permission; she was with him 
4
 Bumper v. North Carolina is cited in Rakas v. Illinois 
as still viable and distinct from Rakas itself (as is Mr. Grueber's 
case). See Brief of Appellant at 14-16 found in Appendix C. 
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in the van. See Munson v. State, 748 P.2d 324, 334 (Okla. Crim. 
1988). By driving the car, he necessarily had possession of the 
keys. See People v. Tufts, 717 P.2d 485, 490-91 (Colo. 1986). 
Additionally, Mr. Grueber reiterates that those cases 
relied on by the State, and subsequently by the Court of Appeals, 
are inapposite to his facts. Mr. Grueber was not a passenger in the 
van nor did he ever claim to not have an interest in the van or the 
gun. Rather, unlike those other defendants, he remained consistent 
in his assertion of standing to challenge the unlawful seizure. Cf. 
Rakas v. Illinois; State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984). 
The corrected facts of this case establish a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the van and its possessions, including the 
gun. This Court should now find standing to be met and then reach 
the issue that the gun was seized contrary to the law outlined by 
the plain view search exception to the warrant requirement. See 
Brief of Appellant at 11-19, attached as Appendix C. 
Alternatively, Mr. Grueber urges that inasmuch as the 
trial court did not permit evidence to be introduced on the issue 
that the Court of Appeals deemed so critical to its assessment of 
whether standing existed, he requests the case be remanded to the 
trial court where he can establish in more detail the nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Ray and his interests in the van and the gun. 
Finally, Mr. Grueber notes that rejecting his petition 
would allow a decision to stand which seriously jeopardizes the 
rights of accused persons to challenge the legality of searches and 
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seizures of automobiles they may drive which are not registered in 
their names. The current opinion, if allowed to stand, will 
negatively impact on too many of our citizens. Once a police 
officer discovers that the driver of an automobile is not the 
registered owner, the opinion from the Court of Appeals permits the 
officer to seize and search the vehicle without considerations of 
basic rights of privacy against unreasonable police intrusion. In 
effect, once the officer discovers that a non-owner is driving the 
car, without more, this decision gives him carte blanche to search 
and seize with impunity. The current opinion too narrowly 
constricts our rights as citizens, and Mr. Grueber urges this Court 
to grant his petition to correct this diminution of critical and 
historic rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Grueber respectfully requests that this Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari be granted and that this Court review the issues 
addressed herein. 
SUBMITTED this / ' day of August. 198f9. ti   
Attorney for Defend 
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underlying the original award. 
We have examined the trial court's comm-
ents from the bench in the modification 
hearing, and have found little explanation as 
to the reasoning behind the denial of LaRae's 
petition. The hearing transcript reveals that 
keeping the children together was one reason 
for awarding initial custody to the father, but 
there is nothing to indicate why the court 
dispensed with that objective in awarding 
custody of only the older children to LaRae. 
The trial court's initial custody award 
appears to have been properly premised on the 
"best interests" standard of Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-10 (1989). The initial decree does 
not, however, discuss the underlying factual 
basis for the decision. The court merely con-
cluded that Raymond was "a proper parent to 
be awarded the care, custody and control of 
the minor children." The original decree thus 
provides no baseline analysis of the relevant 
factors for the award of custody to Raymond 
against which the claimed change of circums-
tances can be measured.2 Because there is 
simply insufficient factual grounds expressed 
to conclude whether a change of circumstances 
has been demonstrated, we are compelled to 
remand the case to the trial court for entry of 
appropriate findings.3 Those findings should 
articulate the considerations behind the initial 
award of custody and the order denying 
modification, and should reflect the current 
legal standard for modification of custody.4 
The order denying LaRae's petition to 
modify custody of the two youngest children is 
vacated and the case is remanded for entry of 
appropriate findings. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Neither party challenges the custody award of the 
older children. 
2. Those relevant factors may include: the prefer-
ence of the children; keeping siblings together; the 
relative strength of the children's bonds with one or 
both of the prospective custodians; the general int-
erest in continuing previously determined custody 
arrangements where the children are happy and well-
adjusted; the prospective custodian's moral chara-
cter, emotional stability, and duration and depth of 
desire for custody; the ability to provide personal 
rather than surrogate care; significant impairment of 
ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, 
excessive drinking, etc.; the reasons for having reli-
nquished custody in the past; the prospective cust-
odian's religious compatibility with the children; 
kinship, which may include stepparent status; and 
the financial condition of the prospective custodian. 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 
1982). 
3. Without such findings, for example, it is difficult 
to distinguish Raymond's voluntary relinquishment 
of custody to LaRae from the situation in Tuckey v. 
T\,„ir..„ AAO P ->H as mtah iQjm frhanoe of circu-
mstances shown where mother is temporarily absent 
from state, leaving custody of children with grand-
parents). 
4. LaRae contends on appeal that she has demons-
trated a sufficient change of circumstances to justify 
a modification of custody. Since we do not reach 
this issue, we have no occasion to consider whether 
the trial court correctly applied the legal standard as 
set forth in Elmer v. Elmer, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 
39-41 (1989); see also Maughan, 770 P.2d at 159-
61. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Darren Neil Grueber ("Grueber") 
was convicted of aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-103 (1978). Grueber appeals from 
his conviction claiming: (1) a shotgun seized 
during a warrantless search should have been 
suppressed; (2) he was prejudiced by the 
State's failure to produce requested informa-
tion during discovery; (3) he was denied effe-
ctive assistance of counsel; and (4) there was 
insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 
We affirm. 
FACTS 
On August 13, 1986, Michael Wade was 
driving his automobile southbound onto the I-
15 on-ramp near 13th South in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. A green and white Ford van 
pulled up beside Mr. Wade in the right-hand 
lane of the on-ramp. The driver of the van 
yelled at Mr. Wade for not driving fast 
enough and attempted to force Mr. Wade's 
automobile off the road. The two vehicles 
State v. 
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proceeded side by side up the ramp for a 
sufficient length of time for Mr. Wade to view 
the driver of the van. 
After merging onto the interstate, Mr. Wade 
was still traveling next to the green and white 
van. At this time, he observed a woman pas-
senger in the van pointing a shotgun at him. 
Mr. Wade quicky applied his brakes and 
positioned his automobile directly behind the 
green and white van* From this vantage point, 
Mr0 Wade observed the van's license plate 
number (674 ALH) and other identifiable 
features. As the vehicles approached the 1-80 
interchange, Mr. Wade veered to the far left 
lane and fled toward the 1-80 entrance. At 
this time, Mr. Wade observed a shotgun stic-
king out of the driver's window of the green 
and white van, observed a large tattoo on the 
driver's upper arm and heard shotgun blasts. 
From these events, Mr. Wade concluded the 
driver of the van had fired two shots at his 
automobile. The shotgun blasts neither 
damaged his automobile nor injured the occ-
upants. 
The green and white van did not follow Mr. 
Wade as he entered the 1-80 interchange. Mr. 
Wade exited 1-80 and went directly to the 
South Salt Lake Police Department. He rep-
orted the incident and his observations to the 
police, including the van's license plate 
number. A registration check disclosed 
Carolyn Ray as the owner of the van. 
On October 14, 1986, Mr. Wade viewed a 
number of photos from which he positively 
identified Grueber as the person who fired the 
shotgun at him. 
In a separate incident, on November 7, 
1986, Officer Scott Robinson of the Murray 
City Police Department was informed the 
occupants of a green and white van, license 
plate number 674 ALH, had attempted to sell 
a welder which the police had reason to 
believe had been stolen during a recent burg-
lary at the Murray City Golf Course. Officer 
Robinson requested a registration check which 
again revealed Carolyn Ray as the owner of 
the van. Officer Robinson then proceeded to 
the address listed on the registration, and 
waited for the van's arrival. When the van 
entered the driveway, Officer Robinson exited 
his car and identified himself as a police 
officer. As he approached the van, Officer 
Robinson observed the driver get out of the 
van and run to the back of the house. Officer 
Robinson followed the driver, but his pursuit 
was impeded by a dog tied to the side of the 
house. The driver was later apprehended by 
Officer Robinson and identified as the defen-
dant, Grueber. 
Officer Robinson returned to the van after 
encountering the dog and observed Carolyn 
Ray, several children, and an adult male 
exiting the van. Through the windows of the 
Soon thereafter, a representative of the golf 
course arrived and positively identified the 
welder in the van as the welder stolen from the 
Murray City Golf Course. Officer Robinson 
then entered the van and attempted to locate 
the serial number on the welder. Once inside, 
Officer Robinson saw a shotgun with a pistol 
grip situated near the driver's seat, partially 
covered but in plain view. 
Officer Robinson ran a check for warrants 
on Grueber. The check showed a warrant for 
aggravated assault from Sandy City and 
another warrant from Salt Lake City. Officer 
Robinson seized the welder, the shotgun, and 
some Halloween masks from the van and 
arrested Grueber. 
A hearing was held prior to trial on 
Grueber's motion to suppress the shotgun 
from evidence and Grueber renewed his obj-
ection at trial. Officer Robinson articulated 
three reasons for seizing the shotgun: (1) the 
gun was present with other stolen property; (2) 
the driver, with an outstanding warrant for 
aggravated assault, had fled the scene and thus 
the officer believed the gun could have been 
used in the prior crime; (3) the Halloween 
masks were present with the weapon, indica-
ting a criminal purpose for the presence of the 
gun. The trial court denied Grueber's motion, 
finding Grueber did not have standing to 
object to the seizure of the gun and that the 
seizure was proper. 
At trial, Officer Richard Mattingly, a 
witness for the State, utilized notes during his 
direct examination which had not been prov-
ided to the prosecution, and consequently, had 
not been furnished to defense counsel, though 
the notes were covered by a defense discovery 
request. Defendant filed a motion for a mist-
rial claiming he was prejudiced by the late 
disclosure of these police reports and notes. 
The trial court allowed defense counsel addi-
tional time to examine ihe notes and prepare 
for his cross-examination of Officer Matti-
ngly. As a result, the trial was recessed for 24 
hours. The court also required the State to 
recall any prior witnesses, including Mr. 
Wade, if defense counsel wished to re-
examine the witnesses in light of the newly 
discovered notes. However, the court denied 
Grueber's motion for a mistrial finding: (1) 
the discovery violation was discovered prior to 
the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief 
and therefore, any prejudice was cured; (2) the 
information in the notes was inculpatory in 
nature and since neither party obtained the 
notes prior to trial, their unavailability was 
probably, on the whole, beneficial to Grueber; 
and (3) any possible prejudice would be pre-
vented or mitigated by giving defense counsel 
adequate time to prepare for and incorporate 
into their trial strategy any new information. 
Subsequently, Grueber was convicted of 
aoarsvafed assault under Utah Code Ann. 
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SUPPRESSION OF THE SHOTGUN 
Grueber argues the shotgun seized from the 
green and white van should not have been 
allowed into evidence. Although Grueber 
concedes the shotgun was in plain view when 
seized, he claims the shotgun was not clearly 
incriminating and the officer did not have 
probable cause to believe it was connected to 
any criminal activity. 
The State argues Grueber had no expecta-
tion of privacy in the van or the gun, and thus 
he does not have standing to object to the 
seizure of the gun. The State further argues 
that even if Grueber could object to the 
seizure, the police officer had probable cause 
to seize the gun since it was clearly incrimin-
ating. We do not reach the issue of whether 
the gun found in plain view during an other-
wise proper search was properly seized as 
clearly incriminating since we agree that 
Grueber did not have an expectation of 
privacy in the van or the gun, and thus cannot 
complain of the seizure. 
The concept of standing is not "theoretically 
separate" under the fourth amendment. Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139, 99 S. Ct. 421, 
428, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). The proper test, 
which implicitly incorporates the concept of 
standing, is whether the person who claims the 
protection of the fourth amendment "has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
invaded place." Id. at 143, 99 S. Ct. at 430. See 
also State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 
126-27 (Utah 1987); State v. Larocco, 742 
P.2d 89, 91 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The United States Supreme Court has rep-
eatedly recognized that an expectation of 
privacy in an automobile is different from an 
expectation of privacy in one's residence. "We 
have on numerous occasions pointed out that 
cars are not to be treated identically with 
houses or [ a jpa r tmen t s for [f]ourth 
[a]mendment purposes." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 
148, 99 S. Ct. at 433 (citing United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 
2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 96 S. 
Ct. 3074, 3084, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Car-
dwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S. Ct. 
2464, 2469, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974)). 
The legitimate expectation of privacy test is 
not a "bright line" test but is fact sensitive. 
Therefore, in order to determine whether 
Grueber had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the van or the gun, we compare the 
facts before us with the facts in other similar 
cases. 
The State relies on, among others, the foll-
owing cases to assert Grueber had no reason-
able expectation of privacy in the green and 
white van at the time the shotgun was seized 
from it: Rakas; Constantino; State v. Valdez, 
689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984); State v. Purcell, 
586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978). 
urueoer ^ 
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In Rakas, police stopped a van they suspe-
cted to be the get-away car in a recent 
robbery. The defendants were passengers in 
the car which the owner was driving. The 
police searched the car and found a box of 
rifle shells in the glove compartment and a 
sawed-off rifle under the front passenger 
seat. Defendants were arrested. The Court 
held the defendants, as occupants of the van, 
had neither a proprietary nor a possessory 
interest in the automobile, nor an interest in 
the property seized. 439 U.S. at 148. Although 
the defendants were in the car with the per-
mission of the owner, the Court found they 
did not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the particular areas of the autom-
obile which the police searched. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 
Rakas analysis in at least three of its decisions. 
In Stare v. Constantino, defendant was conv-
icted of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute after an inventory 
search of the car he was driving disclosed two 
plastic bags containing marijuana. A police 
investigation revealed the car that defendant 
was driving was registered to another person. 
Defendant did not claim he had driven the car 
with the permission of the owner or that he 
had borrowed the car under circumstances that 
would imply permissive use. 732 P.2d at 127. 
The court held that "[ajbsent claimed right to 
possession, [defendantl could not assert any 
expectation of privacy in the items seized and 
had no standing to object to the search." Id. 
In Srare v. Valdez, defendant was arrested 
for producing a driver's license with a false 
name following a stop by police officers who 
noticed that defendant's car had no front 
license plate. Defendant told police officers 
that he did not own the car. The officers 
searched the car without obtaining a warrant 
and discovered an attache case in the trunk 
which was closed but contained a check that 
partially protruded from the case. The officers 
opened the case and discovered certain items 
of false identification. Because defendant 
conceded that he did not own the car or 
attache case containing the evidence compla-
ined of, the Utah Supreme Court held that he 
did not have any legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the effects searched. 689 P.2d at 
1335. Accord State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d at 
443. 
Grueber argues the following cases support 
his claim that he did have a reasonable expe-
ctation of privacy in the van: United States v. 
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 
(1951); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987); In re J.R.M., 487 S.W.2d 502 
(Mo. 1972)(en banc). 
In United States v. Jeffers, the Supreme 
Court held the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his aunt's hotel 
room where the defendant had been given a 
I key to the hotel room, had the occupant's 
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permission to use the room at will, and often 
entered the room for various purposes. 342 
U.S. at 50-52. 
In State v. Larocco, this court held the 
defendant had standing to challenge the lega-
lity of the search of a van which the police 
subsequently determined was stolen. At the 
time of the search, the van was registered in 
the defendant's name, was parked in front of 
his home, and had been used exclusively by 
the defendant as the asserted owner and by no 
one else for an extended period of time. 742 
P.2dat92. 
Grueber also relies on In re J.R.M., wherein 
the Missouri Supreme Court held that a juv-
enile had standing to challenge the warrantless 
search of an automobile even though he was 
not the record owner of the van, and was not 
on the premises at the time of the search. The 
evidence showed the juvenile had his own key 
to the car, had the right to use the car at any 
time, regularly drove the car to school, used 
the car as much as he would have if the title 
had been in his name, was included as an 
insured driver under the automobile insurance 
policy on the car, and lived with his parents 
where the car was kept. 487 S. W.2d at 509. 
We believe the facts presented in this case 
are closer to the cases cited by the State where 
courts have found a nonowner had no reaso-
nable expectation of privacy in an automobile. 
In the instant case, the seized shotgun was 
owned by and registered to defendant's girlf-
riend, Carolyn Ray. Similarly, Ms. Ray was 
the registered owner of the green and white 
van. Although the van was parked in front of 
Ms. Ray's home at the time of the search and 
defendant claimed he lived with Ms. Ray, 
defendant was not in the van when it was 
searched and the gun seized. At the time the 
gun was seized, Grueber stated he did not even 
know the gun was in the van. 
There is no evidence in the record establis-
hing Grueber had Ms. Ray's permission to use 
either the van or the gun at will, had a key to 
the van, or even how often he had used either 
the van or the gun in the past. Grueber cites 
no facts which other courts have found rele-
vant to demonstrate a nonowner had a poss-
essory or proprietary interest in an automo-
bile. Grueber merely relies on his alleged live-
in relationship with Ms. Ray to claim a 
privacy interest in the van and gun. Even 
assuming the existence of such a relationship, 
under the facts in the record, we find Grueber 
did not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the van or the seized shotgun. 
DISCOVERY VIOLATION 
Grueber next argues the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for a mistrial after Officer 
Mattingly relied on reports and notes during 
his direct examination which had been reque-
sted by, but not furnished to, defense counsel 
he was prejudiced because had he known the 
contents of the additional reports he would 
not have impeached Mr. Wade on cross-
examination as to certain facts testified to but 
not appearing in any police report. These facts 
included that the shotgun used in the alleged 
assault did not have a stock but had a strap, 
and that there was a "Harley-Davidson" 
sticker on the back of the van driven by 
Grueber. 
A trial court's ruling on a motion for mis-
trial should not be upset unless it clearly 
appears the trial court abused its discretion. See 
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 
1988); State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390 
(Utah 1977); Stare v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 
517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974). See also State v. 
Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 818 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-30(a) (1982) 
provides "(a]ny error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded." In State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated, 
[w]e have ruled in several cases that 
the Rule 30 phrase "affect the sub-
stantial rights of a party" means 
that an error warrants reversal 
"only if a review of the record 
persuades the court that without the 
error there was 'a reasonable like-
lihood of a more favorable result 
for the defendant.'" 
Id. at 919 (quoting Stare v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 
1040, 1048 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in original)). 
The Knight court provided further guidance by 
defining what is meant by a "reasonable like-
lihood." "For an error to require reversal, the 
likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in 
the verdict." 734 P.2d at 920. 
We are not convinced the impeachment of 
Mr. Wade on minor questions concerning the 
identification of the gun and van because such 
information was not contained in Officer 
Mattingly's partial report affected the 
"substantial rights" of the defendant. We 
conclude there is not a reasonable likelihood 
the trial outcome would have been more fav-
orable to Grueber if Grueber had received the 
materials used by Officer Mattingly, prior to 
trial, and had therefore, conducted his cross-
examination of Mr. Wade in a different 
manner. Cf. State v. Schreuder, 111 P.2d 264, 
276 (Utah 1985); Srare v. Carter, 707 P.2d 
656, 661-62 (Utah 1985). 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
During direct examination, Grueber was 
asked by his attorney if he had been convicted 
of a felony. Grueber responded that he had 
been convicted of distribution of marijuana in 
1980. Upon further questioning, Grueber also 
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admitted that in 1978, at the age of 17, he had 
been convicted of joy-riding, a misdemeanor. 
Grueber claims these convictions were properly 
excludable under Utah R. Evid. 609 and thus 
his counsel's performance was constitutionally 
defective. 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Grueber must meet the elements of a 
two-prong test. 
First, the defendant must show that 
counsel's performance was defic-
ient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant 
by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. Second, 
the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires showing 
that counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the two-
prong Strickland standard in State v. Frame, 
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
The mere fact that defendant received an 
unfavorable result does not give rise to the 
conclusion that defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., State v. Buel, 
700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985). If the defen-
dant fails to make the required showing of 
either deficient performance on counsel's part 
or of sufficient prejudice as a result of 
counsel's error, then defendant's ineffective-
ness claim is defeated. See, e.g., State v. 
Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). 
To establish prejudice, 
[i]t is not enough to claim that the 
alleged errors had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome or could have 
had a prejudicial effect on the fact 
finders. To be found sufficiently 
prejudicial, defendant must affir-
matively show that a "reasonable 
probability" exists that, but for 
counsel's error, the result would 
have been different. We have 
defined "reasonable probability" as 
that sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the reliability of the 
verdict. 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. Accord State v. 
Archuletta, 141 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1987). 
In the instant case, we need not address 
whether counsel's questioning of Grueber 
about his prior convictions was deficient per-
formance,1 as we find Grueber has not met his 
burden of showing that the introduction of his 
prior convictions into evidence was prejudicial. 
In effect, Grueber has failed to show that but 
for his counsel's alleged deficiencies, there 
exists any "reasonable probability" that the 
jury's verdict would have been different. 
Moreover, this case is distinguishable from 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987), 
where the court found that counsel's failure to 
exclude prior convictions was reversible error. 
In Gentry, the defendant did not take the 
stand because of the admission of his prior 
convictions. The Gentry court was persuaded 
there was a reasonable likelihood that the 
result would have been different because the 
court could only speculate as to what defen-
dant's testimony might have been and its 
effect upon the outcome of the trial. Id. at 
1038. In the instant case, Grueber took the 
stand and the evidence received during trial 
against him was convincing independent of the 
admission of prior convictions that had atte-
nuated relevance to the crime charged. 
Rather, this case is comparable to Hoeck v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, 698 P.2d 666 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985), where defendant's 
trial counsel conceded that defendant had five 
prior "driving while intoxicated" convictions 
and four prior "driving with license revoked" 
convictions. The court held that such a conc-
ession did not amount to ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Id. at 668. Accord Stevens v. 
State, 540 P.2d 1199 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). 
Because Grueber failed to show the introd-
uction into evidence of his prior convictions 
was prejudicial to the outcome of the trial, 
Grueber's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel must fail. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Grueber's final claim is that insufficient 
evidence existed to support his aggravated 
assault conviction. We disagree. 
In considering a sufficiency of the evidence 
question, we will review the evidence and all 
inferences reasonably drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict. State 
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). We 
will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when that evidence "is sufficie-
ntly inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant commi-
tted the crime of which he was convicted." Id. 
See also State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d 1029, 1030 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Grueber does not claim there was insuffic-
ient evidence to support the elements of agg-
ravated assault but simply claims the assault 
victim, Mr. Wade, was not credible. This 
court will not second guess the determinations 
of the fact finder as to witness credibility, and 
based on the record before us the evidence is 
not "'sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defe-
ndant committed the crime of which he [or 
shel was convicted.'" Sfare v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 124 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Petree, 
-A urace Drilling LJomps 
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659 P.2d at 444). Thus, we find that there was 
sufficient evidence upon which to base 
Grueber's aggravated assault conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, we find the trial court properly 
denied Grueber's motion to suppress the 
shotgun from evidence because Grueber did 
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the van searched or the gun seized,, We further 
find Grueber was not prejudiced by the 
State's discovery violation since there is not a 
reasonable likelihood that the trial outcome 
would have been different in the absence of 
the violation. Additionally, Grueber did not 
receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to 
counsel's introduction of prior convictions 
because Grueber failed to show this prejudiced 
the outcome of his trial. Finally, we find there 
was sufficient evidence to support Grueber's 
assault conviction. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Counsel did make a successful motion in limine 
to exclude testimony as to an alleged assault with a 
machete committed by defendant. This is some evi-
dence that counsel's choice not to dispute the 
admissibility of the less prejudicial convictions was 
merely trial strategy. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Petitioner Grace Drilling Company appeals 
from the decision of the Board of Review of 
the Industrial Commission ("Board") awarding 
Gordon E. Goodale unemployment compens-
ation benefits. The Board concluded Mr. 
Goodale was not discharged from his emplo-
yment for disqualifying conduct under Utah 
Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1) (1988). We 
affirm the Board's determination. 
FACTS 
We review only those facts relevant to the 
issues presented. In January 1988, Mr. 
"Goodale was hired by Grace Drilling to work 
as a foreman on two of its oil drilling rigs in 
Uintah County, Utah. As a condition of 
employment, Mr. Goodale agreed to abide by 
Grace Drilling's safety manual, work rules, 
and regulations. Mr. Goodale also consented 
to submit to random drug testing. Both Grace 
Drilling's safety manual and the consent 
forms signed by Mr. Goodale clearly stated 
that testing positive on a drug screen while on 
duty was cause for discharge. Mr. Goodale 
acknowledged that he had read and unders-
tood the manual, drug policy, and consent 
form. 
While at work on March 17, 1988, Mr. 
Goodale was randomly selected for drug 
testing. He voluntarily submitted a urine 
sample and executed another consent form. 
On the form, Mr. Goodale disclosed that he 
had been taking Advil within the past seven 
days. Mr. Goodale also verbally informed his 
supervisor that he had been taking two pres-
cription drugs for lower back pain, the names 
of which he could not recall. He offered to go 
home to retrieve the names of the drugs, but 
Mr. Goodale's supervisor informed him that it 
was unnecessary. Instead, the supervisor inf-
ormed Mr. Goodale that if the test results 
were positive, he would be given an opportu-
nity to present the names of the other two 
drugs for Grace Drilling to consider. The drug 
test was conducted and Mr. Goodale's urine 
sample tested positive for marijuana. Mr. 
Goodale was discharged on March 24, 1988, 
without being given an opportunity to provide 
the names of the two prescription drugs he 
told his supervisor he had been using prior to 
the drug test. 
Mr. Goodale filed for and was awarded 
unemployment benefits. Grace Drilling appe-
aled the Department of Employment Secu-
rity's initial determination by notice dated 
May 12, 1988. At the administrative hearing, 
Grace Drilling's representative had no pers-
onal knowledge of Mr. Goodale's drug test or 
the circumstances surrounding his discharge. 
Furthermore, the written test results were not 
offered into evidence, and Grace Drilling 
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APPENDIX B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— O O O O O — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Darren Neil Grueber, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No- 870532-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for 
Rehearing filed by the Appellant. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 7th day of July, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
(QMl^ 
Mary T/ NOonan 
Clerk yt)f the Court 
APPENDIX C 
Copied portion of Appellant's Opening Brief 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
DENYING MR. GRUEBER'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE 
SHOTGUN FROM ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE, 
In response to discovery motions, the prosecution 
indicated the intent to introduce a shotgun into evidence at 
Mr. Grueber's trial (R. 21-22). Prior to trial/ defense counsel 
moved to have that evidence suppressed (R. 30-37/ R. 131 at 1-33. 
See Addendum A for memorandum in support of that motion.). That 
motion was denied by the Court (R. 63/ R. 131 at 33) and the 
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shotgun was admitted over the renewed objection of defense counsel 
at trial (R. 130 at 60). Mr. Grueber insists that the Court's 
ruling was erroneous and prejudicial. 
On November 7, 1986, Murray City Police Officer Scott 
Robinson received information that individuals in a green and white 
van had attempted to sell a welder believed to be stolen (R. 131 at 
5). The officer confirmed a welder had been stolen and then ran a 
check on the license number of the green and white van (R. 131 at 
6). The officer testified at the suppression hearing that after the 
van arrived home, he got out of his car and Mr. Grueber, who had 
been driving, jumped out of the van and ran behind the house (R. 131 
at 7). The officer further testified that Mr. Grueber was not under 
arrest but that he did tell Mr. Grueber to stop (R. 131 at 15). The 
officer testified that he pursued Mr. Grueber until he encountered a 
dog on the side of the house (R. 131 at 7-8). 
Mr. Grueber disputes that he ran from the officer and 
insists that the officer did not order him to stay or tell him that 
he was arrested (R. 25-26). Mr. Grueber claims to have walked away 
because of a long-standing vendetta that the officer appears to have 
against him (R. 26). 
The officer returned to the van and inter alia spotted a 
welder inside (R. 131 at 8). He then entered the van to look for an 
identification number (R. 131 at 10). While inside the van, the 
officer saw a shotgun and some Halloween masks—Halloween having 
occurred just days prior (R. 131 at 12). The officer then seized 
the gun and masks as evidence taken in conjunction with other 
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stolen property (presumably the welder) over the protestations of 
the declared legal owner of the gun, Ms. Carolyn Ray (R. 131 at 13/ 
16, 23; R. 28-29). 
Officer Robinson testified at the suppression hearing 
that he seized the gun because (1) he believed it could have been 
stolen in conjunction with the welder (R. 131 at 17-18), and (2) he 
believed that the combination of the gun and Halloween masks "could 
possibly be some type of evidence used in a previous crime" (R. 131 
at 19).2 
Following the testimony of Officer Robinson, counsel for 
Mr. Grueber moved to suppress the shotgun because the officer lacked 
the requisite probable cause to believe the gun had been involved in 
criminality (R. 131 at 23). The prosecutor answered by stating 
that: (1) because the shotgun belonged to Ms. Ray, Mr. Grueber had 
no standing to challenge the seizure; (2) when Mr. Grueber got out 
of the van and ran (or walked) away, he abandoned all interest in 
the property within it; and (3) the search (not the seizure) was 
unobtrusive and permissible under current case law (R. 131 at 
2
 The Court also asked several questions of Officer 
Robinson and by leading him, elicited a third reason. The Court 
asked him, "Was the fact that there was an outstanding warrant for 
aggravated assault, although you did not know the nature of whatever 
was involved in that assault, was that a factor in your decision to 
seize that gun?" The officer answered, "I believe it was." (R. 131 
at 21.) Defense counsel objected to the leading nature of the 
question and pointed out he had not given that answer before (R. 131 
at 22). This third reason should not factor into this Court's 
assessment of this issue for that reason. Mr. Grueber insists, 
however, that the officer's lack of knowledge regarding the details 
of the outstanding warrant negates reliance on this rationale to 
support a seizure of the shotgun for the same reasons the other two 
fail. 
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23-26). Counsel for Mr. Grueber conceded the search was not an 
issue but argued that the seizure was unlawful and further protested 
that standing existed through the relationship Mr. Grueber had with 
the automobile and with Ms. Ray including a six-year status as 
common law spouse and father of several children with Ms. Ray 
(R. 130 at 112, 120). 
The Court ultimately held for the State, finding that 
Mr. Grueber lacked standing, that he abandoned the property, and 
that the seizure was otherwise justified (R. 131 at 33). 
The question of standing has been resolved by the United 
States Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 123 (1978). The 
standard announced in Rakas is that standing to object to a Fourth 
Amendment violation hinges on "whether the person who claims 
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the invaded space." 439 U.S. at 143. 
Notably, the Rakas court upheld an earlier decision, 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), which demonstrates 
the error by the trial court in this case. 
In Bumper, the appellant lived with his grandmother in 
her home. He challenged the search and seizure of his grandmother's 
rifle found in the house as violative of his own Fourth Amendment 
rights. The Court found that there could be no serious question as 
to the grandson's right to challenge the search, indicating that 
"[t]he rifle was used by all members of the household and was found 
in the common part of the house." 391 U.S. at 548 n.ll. Rakas 
reaffirmed Bumper as good law, acknowledging that the defendant in 
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Bumper "had a substantial possessory interest in both the house 
search and the rifle seized." 439 U.S. at 136. Ownership is 
therefore not the talisman to standing. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Rakas opinion and 
rationale, having discussed the question of standing in several 
cases. In State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334-35 (Utah 1984), the Court 
found that the accused lacked standing because he disclaimed 
ownership in both the car and the attache case at issue and 
concomitantly because he failed to show that he had any legitimate 
expectation of privacy. In State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 
126-27 (atah 1987), the atah Supreme Court again found no standing 
because the defendant driver of another's car failed to offer 
evidence that he either had permissive use of the car or had the car 
under circumstances which could imply permissive use. 
This Court has also reviewed the doctrine of standing, 
noting that: 
In each Otah case where the search was upheld it 
was clearly established and not disputed prior to 
the search that defendant did not own or did not 
have an interest in the property searched. These 
cases are distinguishable from those where 
defendant asserts ownership of the property, or 
otherwise an interest giving rise to a "legitimate 
expectation of privacy." We agree with the 
reasoning in State v. Constantino, that there must 
be at least a claimed right to possession in the 
property. 
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 92 (atah App. 1987) cert, granted 
(1/26/88). What was absent in State v. Valdez and State v. 
Constantino appears in State v. Larocco where the car in question 
was parked in front of the accused's house and registered in his 
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name. _Id. The instant case is also distinguishable from State v. 
Valdez and State v, Constantino and is aligned more closely with 
State v, Larocco and Bumper v. North Carolina where standing was 
held to have existed.. Standing exists for Mr. Grueber because he 
regularly drove the car, had it parked outside his residence, and, 
unlike the defendants in State v. Valdez and State v. Constantino, 
claimed a proprietary and possessory interest in the van and in the 
shotgun. 
Professor Lafave suggests other reasons for granting 
Mr. Grueber standing on these facts. Professor Lafave states: 
Unquestionably, a spouse of the person with the 
possessory interest also has standing as to the 
premises if that spouse also resides there, as do 
offspring who likewise make those premises their 
home. 
Lafave, Search and Seizure, 511.3(a) at 285 (footnotes omitted). He 
later states: 
Just as family members living with the owner or 
tenant of premises share with him an expectation 
of privacy in that residence, it would seem that 
they likewise share a protected privacy interest 
in vehicles used by the family. As explained in 
In re J.R.M., [487 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. 1972)], holding 
a 16-year-old son living at home had standing to 
object to the search of a car frequently used by 
him but owned by his father and parked in a space 
rented by his father at the time of its seizure: 
If the search had been of the house in 
which appellant lived with his parents and 
officers had seized evidence against appellant 
from the bathroom used by him and others, it 
seems clear, under the Supreme Court decisions, 
that he would have standing to object to 
evidence obtained by an unauthorized search, 
even though he was not present when the search 
occurred. The question then becomes one of 
whether he must show more to establish standing 
as to the search of the Corvair than he would 
have been required to do in the case of a 
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search of the bathroom in the house where he 
lived. . . . We perceive no reason for a 
different approach or test where the search is 
of an automobile . . . 
If we should deny standing to appellant 
herein under the factual situation that 
existed, we logically also would be required to 
deny standing to the wife of the owner of an 
automobile who had no title thereto but who 
used the car regularly, as did the appellant 
here. 
Id. at §11.3(e) at 335 (footnotes omitted). The trial court 
accordingly erred in finding no standing. 
With standing now assumed, Mr. Grueber also claims error 
in the Court's determination that he abandoned the property when he 
ran (or walked) away from the van. This ruling is erroneous. As 
Mr. Grueber was not under arrest and did not hear a command to stop, 
he had every right to avoid talking with the officer. Brown v. 
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 
(Utah App. 1987). The theory of abandonment does not fit the facts 
of this case. Abandonment requires more; it requires a 
demonstration of intent to abandon. United States v. Jones, 707 
P.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983). 
It cannot be seriously contended that every time an 
individual parks his or her automobile on the street or in the 
driveway that he or she has abandoned his or her rights to the car 
or its contents. This Court must not tolerate such an expansive 
stretch with the theory of abandonment. 
Finally, there is no other justification to allow 
admission of the shotgun. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 466 (1971), the United States Supreme Court stressed that 
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seized items must be readily and immediately apparent as fruits, 
instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime. In a very recent case, 
the Court has been even more demanding, requiring an officer who is 
lawfully present to get a warrant before he may move an object in 
plain view even a few inches in order to expose the serial number of 
the item he believes to be evidence of a crime. Arizona v. Hicks, 
480 U.S. , 94 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1987). Accord, State v. 
Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985). 
Utah law concurs. Both State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 
210-11 (Utah 1985), and State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 
1983), have held that evidence seized under the plain view exception 
to the warrant requirement, as done in the instant case, must be 
clearly incriminating. This "clearly incriminating11 requirement 
mandates that officers have probable cause to believe the property 
seized is tied to criminal activity. State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 
210. Notably, there is nothing about carrying a gun in Utah that 
connotes criminality. In fact, Utah law expressly provides that 
individuals within this State may carry firearms in any vehicle with 
impunity so long as the firearm is not loaded. Utah Code Ann. 
§76-10-504(2) (1953 as amended). The gun found by Officer Robinson 
was not loaded and was therefore within the framework of the statute 
and lawfully present in the van. 
Furthermore, Officer Robinson could not articulate a sound 
basis for seizing the shotgun. His justifications for seizing the 
shotgun—that it could have been stolen or could have been used in a 
previous crime—were both unfounded speculation lacking the 
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requisite probable cause to permit seizure. The Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States constitution and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution require much more 
basis than that utilized by the officer in this case. Both 
constitutions were violated demanding that the shotgun be suppressed. 
Because the trial court erroneously denied the motion to 
suppress, Mr. Grueber was prejudiced. As the State conceded in 
closing argument: 
The only thing that's necessary is to show that a 
deadly weapon, which State's Exhibit 1 clearly is, 
was used, and that it is capable of causing death 
or serious bodily injury (R. 130 at 146). 
With the shotgun properly suppressed, the State could not have 
established a convincing case. 
As the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to 
suppress, this Court should correct that error. The Court should 
reverse the conviction of Mr. Grueber and remand the case to the 
District Court with instructions to conduct a new trial without the 
improperly seized evidence or dismiss the charges. 
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